### Cubicle vs. the Coffee Shop Behavioral Modes in (Enterprise) End-Users

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### Motivation

- Previous studies of user profiles used traces collected "in-network"
- Corporate networks today have 50-60% mobile hosts
- When profile is constructed in one environment, how different in another?
- Do profiles computed from "averaging" hold true in any of the environments?
- Is there a canonical user profile?
- What (statistics) change when users move?
- Should user profiles care about location?

### Data

- 350+ users, all running Windows XP SP2 custom build
- Collection software (windump+custom app) ran on laptops and (few) desktops
- Unique data-set (most traces collected in network)
- Traces collected for ~5 weeks; s/w automatically deactivated
- Traces periodically uploaded to central server

# Recruiting users

- I400+ people polled from across 3 business units
- Up front and clear statement about intended use
- Explicit consent-- software was installed by users
- Traces are uploaded anonymously; filenames do not identify individual users
- At central server: packets processed and payloads discarded
- Amazon gift certificates given out as enticement

### Environments





- How do users spend their time across environments
- Are there very big differences in protocol activity across the environments
- What are the differences in how various network services are used

### A month in the life of a laptop



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### Environment Lifetimes



median time of "session" (avg. diff =85%)



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### TCP usage (connections)



95th %-ile of connections/15 mins

#### Variation creates "exploit gap"



static thresholds ignore location context



allow a larger operating region for malicious traffic to go undetected



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# Network Services (ports)



fraction of connections for web traffic (80,8080,8888)

### Network Services (ports)



fraction of connections for Microsoft traffic

### Network Services (ports)



a different view-- "popularity" of the protocols

## Conclusions

- Behavior is drastically different across all the dimensions studied
- Profile constructed from averaged behavior not reflective of any particular environment
- No canonical user profile: users vary greatly from each other
- Security mechanisms need to be location aware to close "gaps" that can be exploited

## Questions

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